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PREFACE
Modern philosophy and social thought are preoccupied with the individual, or (as philosophers often entitle her) "the subject." We analyze and address ourselves to a person who either does or should think for herself, seek to satisfy her own preferences, seek to be herself, and possess her own freedom and rights. On the other hand, we wonder whether in this preoccupation we might be missing something of fundamental importance. Empirical scientists tell us that what we call "thinking for ourselves" is really just another causally determined process in nature; skeptics tell us that we have no reason to think that thought of this kind can give us access to reality; post-modernists tell us that the subject or the self, itself, is an illusion; defenders of "traditional values" tell us that there is nothing to deter a subject or a self that sets its authority above that of tradition from disregarding the rights and interests of others; and religious thinkers tell us that insistence on one's own freedom and independence may prevent one from experiencing the affiliation with reality as a whole, and the resulting meaning, value, and identity, that can be found through a relationship with God. All of these critics are likely to suggest that the mere existence of an individual, as such, gives no access to any authoritative conception of value. These critics raise important issues. It is indeed difficult to know how to relate the idea of "free" thought to nature as we normally understand it, or to defend the claim that such thought gives us access to reality; the "subject" or "self" does often seem almost vanishingly abstract; it is not clear that the challenge that rational egoism poses to ethics has yet been effectively met by ethical theory; and it does sometimes appear that people with access to religious or "spiritual" sources of nurture can flourish in ways that atheistic humanists may not flourish. between "fact" and "value" seems wide (even if philosophers now are somewhat less likely to make dogmatic assertions about it than they were in the first half of the twentieth century). In fact, it does not seem unreasonable to imagine that these apparent intellectual and practical failures of modern individualism may contribute to modern people's frequent failures to feel "at home" in their social and natural worlds, and to the lapses into selfishness, ideological idées fixes, violence, and despair that are sometimes associated with these failures. The problem is that the alternative modes of life and thought that are projected by these critiques of modern individualism -the "homes" to which they explicitly or implicitly advise us to return -all seem, in their various ways, to threaten individuals' freedom, which is something that many of us are loath, and feel that we have good reasons for being loath, to give up or to compromise.
1
How can we address these issues, intellectually, without merely lapsing into one schematic extreme or the other, or settling for a merely formless and unprincipled "compromise"? In the history of modern thought on these subjects we find one major thinker who not only refuses to lapse into any schematic extreme position on these issues but addresses them in a uniquely constructive way. That thinker is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
To cut through the confusion that, for many educated people, surrounds Hegel's name, and that results from the great ambition, complexity, and novelty of his undertaking, combined with the religious and political controversies in which it has, almost from the beginning, been caught up, one of the first things to realize is that the conception of rational freedom that is Hegel's point of departure in his ethics and social philosophy and that runs through his metaphysics and philosophical theology is very closely related to that of his great predecessor, Immanuel Kant. Whatever else they may think of Kant's philosophy, few people will question his credentials as an individualist. His "motto of enlightenment: . . . Have courage to use your own understanding!" and his identification of rational autonomy -"the property which will has of being a law to itself" -as the foundation of morality are usually sufficient 1 There is a long tradition in modern thought of seeing modernity as homeless or estranged and in need of a "return" to something else. The German Romantic poet Novalis wrote that "philosophy is actually homesickness" (Werke Indeed, what Hegel attempts to do with Kant's fundamental ideasand with individualism in general -is to preserve what is true in them, while reformulating them in such a way as to avoid the problems in which they otherwise become bogged down.
4 In this way, Hegel's project is precisely to overcome the schematic dualism of individualism and its opposites, in order to get at and do systematic justice to the truth both of individualism and of the important objections that are raised against It is true that some jaundiced observers have thought that they saw in the notion of autonomy the germ of later totalitarian developments, but I am not aware of anyone who thinks she can show such developments taking place within Kant's own thinking. There are limits, of course, to Kant's grasp of the practical implications of autonomy in connection with "marginal" groups such as women, non-Europeans, and people who possess no property, but these limits do not follow from his conception of autonomy itself, nor does he make a serious effort to show that they do. 3 Hegel didn't literally study with Kant, but Kant was the single most important influence on every student of philosophy in Hegel's generation in Germany. Here are a couple of Hegel's strong endorsements of Kantian ideas: "It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason that the unity which constitutes the nature of the Concept is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness" (WL 6:254/GW 12:17-18/584); and "Knowledge of the will first gained a firm foundation and point of departure in the philosophy of Kant, through the thought of its infinite autonomy" (PR §135R). I discuss Hegel's controversial doctrine that "the actual is the rational" in Chapters 4 and 5, and his critique of Kantian "morality" in 5. it. If he succeeds in doing this, his structure of thought presents a constructive alternative to, and a model of how to improve upon, a great deal of present-day debate in the philosophy of knowledge and the will, ethics, social and political theory, and philosophy of religion, and in endeavors as various as scholarship, political debate, personal self-examination, and spiritual life. Because of the centrality of freedom in all of the issues that I listed, what enables Hegel both to overcome the schematic dualisms into which we are inclined to fall, in connection with these issues, and to avoid mere unprincipled "compromise," is, precisely, his theory of freedom. The underlying idea of that theory is to understand freedom as finding itself not only in what it directly proposes to pursue and in the thought process that this reflects, but also in what at first seems opposed to these: in (for example) the mechanisms of one's own bodily existence, or the intentions and desires of other people. Freedom, Hegel argues, is being "with oneself in the other" (paraphrase from PR §7A) -in what initially appears to oppose, conflict with, and detract from one's freedom. This general idea is, of course, familiar to everyone who comments on Hegel's thoughts about freedom. However, the background of the idea -what it is based on, how it is developed, and thus what it really means -is not so familiar. This is because that background and development are presented mainly in Hegel's Logic (I use the capitalized term "Logic" to refer both to Hegel's Science of Logic and to his shorter Encyclopedia Logic, which present substantially the same doctrines). What he develops there is then presupposed throughout his system, including the Philosophy of Spirit (the third volume of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences) and the Philosophy of Right, in which he presents his account of human affairs, including ethics and politics. Hegel's Logic is notorious both for its difficulty and for the controversiality of many of its prominent claims, and these circumstances deter many scholars from engaging with it in detail. Consequently, many discussions of Hegel's thinking about freedom, including almost all of those published in recent decades in English, neglect its foundation in the Logic. In the Science of Logic, Hegel explains (1) the relationship between freedom and finitude or nature -the problem that Kant's "two-worlds" or "two-standpoints" ("noumenal"/"phenomenal") account of freedom left, in the eyes of many of us, essentially unsolved -and thus shows what freedom involves and why it is reasonable to regard it as real. When it is understood, Hegel's position on this issue will be seen to be one of the major historical proposals, on a par with those of St. Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Thomas Reid, and Kant, and having apparent advantages over each of them. It will also turn out that understanding Hegel's account of the relationship between freedom and nature enables us to interpret (2) his position on the nature of knowledge -the reality that the free mind achieves, and therefore has access to -in a way that frees it of the grandiosity that's often attributed F. Hegel (Bonn: Bouvier, 1977) , elucidates important aspects of Hegel's relation to Kant on this issue. But none of the writers I have mentioned in this note, including Will Dudley in the book that I mentioned initially, brings out the train of thought by which Hegel links determinate being to true infinity; nor do they show how that train of thought serves to defend Kant's basic conception of freedom against the criticism that it leaves us without an understanding of the relation between freedom and nature; nor do they show how Hegel's argument for the Concept and the Idea serves to defend true infinity and ethics against the challenges posed by skepticism and "rational egoism. Verlag, 2000) , or any other work on the Logic that I have found. xxviii preface to it, and shows it to be strikingly original and suggestive; and also to interpret (3) his closely related "idealism" -his doctrine that "substance" is "subject," or that being and thought are inseparable -in a way that makes it (again) non-grandiose, non-dogmatic, and, given the problems of alternative views, quite attractive. His argument for his idealism includes, as well, his critique -which is frequently referred to, but has seldom been well understood -of the idea of a non-conceptual "given" that is essential to knowledge. (4) Hegel's idealism connects "value" to "fact" in a way that allows the desert of modern science to bloom with meaning, precisely through the free, rational thought that is widely supposed to have deprived it of meaning. (5) In the same manner, Hegel's philosophical theology -which generations of "Left Hegelians" have tried to transform, ignore, or interpret out of existence, and which is founded on his account of "true infinity," in the Science of Logic -turns out not to threaten, but rather to presuppose, the freedom of individual humans, while showing how that freedom does connect them with something that goes beyond their finite, merely individual existences. In this way, Hegel's theology shows how we can get beyond the apparently interminable war between theism and atheistic naturalism. (6) Hegel's famous "dialectic," including his doctrine of the reality of "contradiction," turns out to be not an unmotivated departure from normal logical principles, but a way of articulating his account of the reality of freedom and God. And finally (7), through his idealism and his theology -which underlie his much-discussed argument for "mutual recognition" -Hegel demonstrates what Plato and Kant also sought to demonstrate: that practical egoism is irrational, so that a practical attitude that amounts to love is, in fact, the most rational attitude to take toward others. Thus, rather than being a baroque collection of claims that are so exotic that it's hard to imagine taking them seriously, Hegel's main doctrines in the Logic turn out to illuminate one another and to resolve fundamental issues in a way that lends credibility to all of them. 6 6 I should note that the Science of Logic contains some doctrines that I have not been able to consider in detail -in particular, its analyses of "Judgment" and "Syllogism." My neglect of these topics means that I can't discuss the relationship between Hegel's Logic and the formal logic of Frege, Russell, et al., though I do provide, in Chapter 4, a fairly detailed interpretation of Hegel's account of "contradiction," in which I show that it should be understood primarily as a thesis about ontology and theology rather than as a thesis about discourse or argument, as such. I have also skipped quickly past most of Hegel's lengthy and rich discussion of mathematics, in "Quantity," and a good deal of his discussion of "Ground," "Existence," and "Appearance," in the Doctrine of Essence.
preface xxix From the Logic, I proceed in Chapter 6 to the Philosophy of Nature and then to the Philosophy of Spirit, in which Hegel elaborates the implications of his analysis for human life -the mind, ethics, economics, politics, history, art, religion, and philosophy -where again I will show that his main doctrines articulate the content and implications of individual freedom in a way that is very helpful in getting beyond the schematic oppositions that pervade our thinking and debate about these matters.
Thus my investigation of Hegel's theory of freedom, while it doesn't attempt to clarify all of the controversial issues in Hegel's philosophical system, will clarify many of the best-known ones and will deal with most of the major texts that expound the system. I hope that by doing so it will encourage readers to take Hegel's philosophy as a whole more seriously than it has been taken, for almost a century in (at least) the English-speaking world, by anyone except a relatively small number of specialists. Where, by "taking Hegel's philosophy seriously," I mean: taking it not merely as a major historical influence on all sorts of other thinkers, but as a major candidate for truth.
As I mentioned, two main obstacles to a sympathetic reception of Hegel's thought, since the 1830s, have been the political and religious controversies in which it has been involved. The last several decades of scholarship have done a lot to remove the political misunderstandings that afflicted the Philosophy of Right, especially in the English-speaking world, up through the 1960s -though there is certainly room for additional productive clarification.
7 On the religious and "metaphysical" side, despite valuable recent work, there is still a major lack of understanding. "Left Hegelians," who hope that Hegel's most important ideas are compatible with atheist or agnostic humanism, propound their Schein (1994) , in our time, have arisen, to a large extent, from a failure to understand the subtle and powerful way in which Hegel's philosophical theology, beginning with his conception of "true infinity," goes beyond the traditional opposition between theism and naturalistic atheism, and between "transcendence" and "immanence." 8 Many discussions of Hegel's philosophical theology are preoccupied with the question of whether it is compatible with traditional or genuine Christianity. As a member of the large group who view Christianity with great respect but not as the sole or even, necessarily, the primary representative of religious truth, I am more interested in the less commonly discussed question of what Hegel's theology can show us about the truth-content of religious experience in general; and there, as I try to show, it is very illuminating indeed.
A result of this interest of mine, and of the fact that I simply lacked the time and space to deal with Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, is that although I have important things to say about Hegel's relation to theism, in general, I can't claim to have dealt comprehensively with
